Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Mapping the 'Demand' Side of Prostitution - Jobs & Economy - The Atlantic Cities

Mapping the 'Demand' Side of Prostitution - Jobs & Economy - The Atlantic Cities

The town of Kennebunk, Maine, recently made headlines for releasing the identities of men charged with patronizing a Zumba instructor-turned-prostitute named Alexis Wright. Despite all the attention, the strategy of "john shaming" is far from unique. It's just one of several tactics city and county police departments across the country routinely use to target the men who pay for sex, rather than the women who sell it.
Michael Shively of the Cambridge, Massachusetts, research firm Abt Associates has spent the past several years gathering loads of information about strategies that aim to reduce the "demand" side of prostitution. Shively and his colleagues have compiled a database of at least 825 cities that employ at least one of these tactics. The work has produced comprehensive reports for the Department of Justice [PDF] as well as a new website called DEMANDForumthat tracks the "anti-demand initiatives" occurring across the United States:
Shively's work has shown that targeting demand can be much more useful than arresting the so-called "supply" side of prostitution: the women themselves, or the pimps trafficking sex. Most communities begin by sweeping the streets for the suppliers of sex, but ultimately find the approach ineffective, he says. The women are often victims themselves who've been forced into the trade for various reasons, and the pimps are easily replaceable once they're taken off the street.

Often women can be R loners that hide in the Ro community and sell sex, they are preyed upon by Oy men and pimps acting as agents for a Y mafia. Exposing Oy-R interactions can help the problem because it works best with secrecy and deception. Oy pimps can grow in numbers exponentially as can clients when there is demand, also taking some R women off the streets just makes it more profitable for others to enter the profession. This is a disconnect caused by weak and biased O policing, R women might not fall through the chaotic cracks of the Ro safety net with more community cooperation. However colors will always manifest to some degree, problems can only be moderated to minimize problems. Legalizing brothels brings them into a neutral I market policed by O, enough transparency moderates exploitation of R and B women as well as reducing R contagion of venereal diseases.

Murder rates: There will be less blood | The Economist

Murder rates: There will be less blood | The Economist

Innovative police efforts, like CompStat, a crime-mapping system, and the “broken-windows” strategy, which focuses on restoring order to communities, were implemented in New York in the early 1990s, and crime rates began to fall.

Communities can be prone to chaotic collapse, R and B people are more timid and when they see signs of broken windows, vandalism, etc they might flee the area. it can then become more taken over by criminals without much opposition. Other areas might have a strong Ro community acting like Neighborhood Watch that resists this crime, backstopping the O police to clean up even small amount sof this chaos. The Broken Window policy then could work not as a policy but because it came along with widespread Ro community anger.

More recently department officials have been trying Operation Impact, a programme which floods troubled areas with police, mostly new recruits. Crime in these “hotspots” tends to drop at twice the citywide rate. The controversial stop-and-frisk policy, under which people suspected of criminal activity are stopped and checked for weapons, is also considered helpful. Ray Kelly, the police commissioner, claims that such proactive policing saved over 5,600 lives between 2002 and 2011.

This is like treating crime as Oy-R contagion, before it grows too much exponentially a surge in police causes it to hit a ceiling and collapse. It can be like controlling an R contagion such as rats or cockroaches by faster fumigating problem areas before they spread. A hot spot is high energy Oy-R.
Some of the tactics used in New York have made their way to the District, where Cathy Lanier, the police chief, credits her department’s crackdown on guns and gangs for the recent decline in violence. As with Mr Kelly, there has been some controversy along the way, for instance when she set up checkpoints around an especially gang-plagued neighbourhood, or proposed that police should go door-to-door in search of guns.

Gangs are usually Y or Ro based rather than being a plague of Oy or R loners. Often Ro gangs evolve as self policing of a neighborhood because of O police mistrust.

Some see her efforts as more public-relations than policing, but it is hard to argue with the results.

21st-Century Yakuza: Recent Trends in Organized Crime in Japan ~Part 1

21st-Century Yakuza: Recent Trends in Organized Crime in Japan ~Part 1 21世紀のやくざ ―― 日本における組織犯罪の最近動向 :: JapanFocus

Andrew Rankin

I - The Structure and Activities of the Yakuza

Japan has had a love-hate relationship with its outlaws.  Medieval seafaring bands freelanced as mercenaries for the warlords or provided security for trading vessels; when not needed they were hunted as pirates.1   

Oy can act as agent predators for Y warlords or be hunted by Y when they turn on them.

Horse-thieves and mounted raiders sold their skills to military households in return for a degree of tolerance toward their banditry. 

This is like the O police that use Oy thieves as snitches in exchange for leniency, this helps to control the Y gangs.

 In the 1600s urban street gangs policed their own neighborhoods while fighting with samurai in the service of the Shogun.  

Ro gangs act like the Ro part of the O police along with some Oy thieves to balance the system, the samurau can be Y.

Feudal lords paid gang bosses to supply day laborers for construction projects.  

Feudal lords can be Y using Oy agents to supply R laborers as prey to work on these projects. 

In the 1800s gambling syndicates assisted government forces in military operations.3   Underworld societies joined with nationalists to become a significant force in politics. 

The underworld is usually Oy because they are secretive, they join Y as agents. Y is nationalistic defending a territory as their own like Y lions.

 For many years police colluded profitably with pickpocketing gangs before being ordered to eliminate them in a nationwide crackdown of 1912.4  

O police can be corrupted by Oy gangs or use them as snitches against Y. When this contagion grows too large there is a crackdown forced from Ro community anger and the Oy thieves collapse chaotically. This is like Ro herd animals like buffalo fighting back against Oy predators like hyena, when there are O animals between them then the Oy hyena are more easily deterred.

 In the 1920s yakuza bosses were elected to the Diet.5   In the postwar era police struggled to control violent street gangs.  Business leaders hired the same gangs to impede labor unions and silence leftists.  

Nationalist governments can become associated with Y mafia, after the war the O police were weakened and unable to control Oy gangs. these Oy were used by Y businesses to attack Ro communist inspired unions and silence R leftists. 

When Eisenhower planned to visit Japan in 1960, the government called on yakuza bosses to lend tens of thousands of their men as security guards.6  

Oy agents as security guards to control Ro-R unrest and protests.

 Corruption scandals entwined parliamentary lawmakers and yakuza lawbreakers throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  One history of Japan would be a history of gangs: official gangs and unofficial gangs.  The relationships between the two sides are complex and fluid, with boundaries continually being reassessed, redrawn, or erased.

Y and Oy are similar to each other except that Y are cooperative teams while Oy are more competitive loners. However people can move from one to the other so the boundary is fluid.

The important role played by the yakuza in Japan’s postwar economic rise is well documented.7   But in the late 1980s, when it became clear that the gangs had progressed far beyond their traditional rackets into real estate development, stock market speculation and full-fledged corporate management, the tide turned against them.  For the past two decades the yakuza have faced stricter anti-organized crime laws, more aggressive law enforcement, and rising intolerance toward their presence from the Japanese public.

As a Roy economy becomes more Biv wealthy Y criminals can become V businessmen but still use dishonest tactics, this can threaten a new Biv forest economy like Y animals hunting there.


The ‘ultimate symbiosis’ between the yakuza and the police that Karel van Wolferen described in 1984 does not endure today.9   Police hostility to the yakuza has intensified, with more raids of yakuza offices and yakuza-run businesses, more arrests of senior rather than street-level gangsters, and more confiscations of illicit yakuza profits.  ‘Yakuza eradication’ has become popular policy, with politicians, governors, mayors, and lawyers’ associations all proclaiming their resolve to destroy the yakuza once and for all.  Anti-yakuza campaigning has recently extended beyond the traditional yakuza world to address a broader sphere of activities deemed to be undesirable or antisocial.

The O police are rebalancing more towards neutrality after Ro community protests, Oy cannot be destroyed but only moderated. If they think this moderation is too severe then snitches will not work with police as there is no leniency to offer them.

However, difficulties in defining the intended targets of these countermeasures, along with a tendency to link organized crime to minority groups or ethnicity, have led some commentators to wonder whether things have gone too far.  The Japanese media reports resistance to burgeoning police powers and concern that some new anti-yakuza legislation may prove harmful to legitimate businesses.  The 21st-century yakuza must also deal with competition from organized gangs of non-yakuza criminals and from foreign crime gangs active in Japan.  Before examining these issues, let us first take a broad look at the state of organized crime in Japan today.

Mass Incarceration and Criminal Justice in America : The New Yorker

Mass Incarceration and Criminal Justice in America : The New Yorker

Six million people are under correctional supervision in the U.S.—more than were in Stalin’s gulags. Photograph by Steve Liss.

A prison is a trap for catching time. Good reporting appears often about the inner life of the American prison, but the catch is that American prison life is mostly undramatic—the reported stories fail to grab us, because, for the most part, nothing happens. One day in the life of Ivan Denisovich is all you need to know about Ivan Denisovich, because the idea that anyone could live for a minute in such circumstances seems impossible; one day in the life of an American prison means much less, because the force of it is that one day typically stretches out for decades. It isn’t the horror of the time at hand but the unimaginable sameness of the time ahead that makes prisons unendurable for their inmates. The inmates on death row in Texas are called men in “timeless time,” because they alone aren’t serving time: they aren’t waiting out five years or a decade or a lifetime. The basic reality of American prisons is not that of the lock and key but that of the lock and clock.

In Aperiomics the I-O police can penalize people with time or energy. Time can be taken from people as a penalty by incarceration or execution, also in go slow impediments like checking in with parole officers and losing a driving license. Energy can be penalized as well,  prisoners might be denied exercise an confinement prevents people from expending energy in doing things they would like. For example a highly energetic Iv agent jailed for a year might lose the amount of energetic work he would have done in that year, this is a bigger penalty to him than to a Bi criminal who would not have been doing much with his time anyway. Iv then fears losing the use of his energy, Bi people fear the loss of their time.
That’s why no one who has been inside a prison, if only for a day, can ever forget the feeling. Time stops. A note of attenuated panic, of watchful paranoia—anxiety and boredom and fear mixed into a kind of enveloping fog, covering the guards as much as the guarded. “Sometimes I think this whole world is one big prison yard, / Some of us are prisoners, some of us are guards,” Dylan sings, and while it isn’t strictly true—just ask the prisoners—it contains a truth: the guards are doing time, too.

For most privileged, professional people, the experience of confinement is a mere brush, encountered after a kid’s arrest, say. For a great many poor people in America, particularly poor black men, prison is a destination that braids through an ordinary life, much as high school and college do for rich white ones.

The scale and the brutality of our prisons are the moral scandal of American life. Every day, at least fifty thousand men—a full house at Yankee Stadium—wake in solitary confinement, often in “supermax” prisons or prison wings, in which men are locked in small cells, where they see no one, cannot freely read and write, and are allowed out just once a day for an hour’s solo “exercise.”

The Myth of Self-Correcting Science

The Myth of Self-Correcting Science - Sarah Estes - The Atlantic

The Myth of Self-Correcting Science

 5Recent academic scandals highlight a history of data falsification and questionable research in social psychology, and serve as calls to action. 

Carlos Jasso/Reuters
Over the last two years, the field of psychology has endured a wave of scandal bookended by fraud cases involving Harvard primatologist Marc Hauser and Dutch social psychologist Diederik Stapel. Even researchers desensitized by scandal-fatigue did a double take when the final report on Stapel's case came out last month. The extent of his creative misinterpretation of the facts make the Hauser case look like child's play. Stapel not only manipulated and fabricated data, he invented entire schools where said data was allegedly collected.

Because science has no real I-O police for research then this Iv-b and V-Bi disconnect can grow quite large, the penalties might be low such as losing a job or research grant.

As if the fraud files weren't enough, then come the mea culpas -- salt in the wounds for students and colleagues still recovering from shattered reputations and a shaken faith in science. The two men released two very different statements telling very similar stories of reckless, ruthless ambition and playing the odds against getting caught. Stapel's "narcissistic wail" was so emotional and contrite as to seem a bit unhinged, while Hauser's read as a cold, calculating non-admission of guilt.
Hauser deftly concedes chagrin for errors made within his lab "whether responsible for them or not," implying that the same students bullied into committing academic fraud were somehow responsible for the car veering off the cliff. Stapel faults a noxious combination of publication pressures, addictive tendencies, and assorted personality issues for his downfall. And while publication pressure was among those issues, he caps off his mea culpa with a plug for his new book -- Derailment, a collection of his therapeutic diaries.

Scientists can become Iv agents in effect committing fraud for the commission of higher wages, research grants, jobs, etc. These are considered to be errors from normal practice, the normal center of V-Bi. This abnormal behavior can reach a tipping point or Iv-B ceiling and go off the cliff into free fall where those fastest at distancing themselves from the problem while profiting at the time do best.

The Slippery Slope
It's easy to revel in the high drama surrounding the downfall of a Hauser or Stapel, but what about the journals that published these scholars? Stapel was a widely cited and highly revered figure. His fraud went undetected for decades in spite of eerily perfect data sets and improbable statistical values. According to Tilburg University's final report, Flawed Science, "There was a general neglect of fundamental scientific standards and methodological requirements from top to bottom."

When journals become agents for V companies and universities rather than neutral I then chaos can grow secretly until it hits a ceiling and crashes.

Scientists fought back, noting that it is rare for reviewers in any field to detect fraud and demanding an apology for the 'slanderous conclusions' drawn in the report.

Without I-O police being available for whistle blowers there is little incentive for scientists to moderate this chaos before it collapses. Instead they try to profit from it and get out before it hits the ceiling.

Social psychologist Kate Ratliff,teaching at Tilburg when the scandal broke noted, " It's a small community and people considered Diederik a friend and mentor...No one understands why these young researchers didn't realize that it was weird that Diederik was giving them datasets. But you learn from watching others. And if there are no others, how would you know what's weird or not? I think that people started out being really sympathetic toward them and have gotten more and more punitive as time passes and hindsight bias kicks in. I think that's really, really unfair."

In Iv-B people think tactically and compete with each other in a secretive environment, if others are doing something then it seems ok and the objective is to beat them. This makes the problem grow exponentially until it hits a ceiling.

They managed to find statistically significant evidence for the absurd hypothesis that listening to a Beatles song could make you 1.5 years younger
Almost more alarming than the few individuals committing academic fraud are the high percentage of researchers who admitted to more common questionable research practices, like post-hoc theorizing and data-fishing (sometimes referred to as p-hacking), in a recent study led by Leslie John.
For the uninitiated: post-hoc theorizing involves creating or revising a hypothesis after you've collected the data; data-fishing entails running a study, continually checking the data after each participant, and stopping as soon as you see a significant result. These practices are eschewed by some, but plenty of others embrace them. Joseph Simmons and colleagues ran a simulation showing how unacceptably easy it was to attain statistical significance using these 'degrees of researcher freedom.' By employing four of these questionable practices at once, they managed to find statistically significant evidence for the absurd hypothesis that listening to a Beatles song could make you 1.5 years younger.

V-Bi statistics can be affected by chaos as the vertical part of Pascal's Triangle, Iv-B researchers can manipulate data chaotically so it is no longer random.

The Lie that Prosecuting Bank Fraud Will Destabilize the Economy Is What Is REALLY Destroying the Economy | The Big Picture

The Lie that Prosecuting Bank Fraud Will Destabilize the Economy Is What Is REALLY Destroying the Economy | The Big Picture

By Washingtons Blog - December 23rd, 2012, 1:30AM

Failing to Prosecute White Collar Crime Guarantees a Weak and Unstable Economy … and Future Financial Crashes


The Departments of Justice and Treasury are pretending that criminally prosecuting criminal banksters will destabilize the economy.
The exact opposite is true.

When the I civil police become biased to Iv then they can also be deceptive for their own advantage, for example to cover up their own previous incompetence or corruption.

Failing to prosecute criminal fraud has been destabilizing the economy since at least 2007 … and will cause huge crashes in the future.

A weak I-O police cause a disconnect in the economy where Iv-B and V-Bi become separated, this Iv-B component tends to boom and bust with fraud and secrecy.

After all, the main driver of economic growth is a strong rule of law.

This moderates the disconnect so companies grow more like trees that are stable rather than Iv-B weeds and V-Bi grass.

Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz says that we have to prosecute fraud or else the economy won’t recover:

If I-O is not strengthened then stimulus or new resources will tend to feed the Iv-B weed companies first which mutate and then collapse. 

The legal system is supposed to be the codification of our norms and beliefs, things that we need to make our system work. If the legal system is seen as exploitative, then confidence in our whole system starts eroding. And that’s really the problem that’s going on.
This is part of the cycle of color imbalance, it starts at B where diminishing Gb resources cause weakness and then economic problems spread up the Biv economy. The legal system is composed of Bi normal represented on a normal curve as to what people think is normal behavior or deviant. It also has an Iv component where exploitive and competitive behavior is allowed to some degree even if deviant because people have rights even if abnormal. in between these two there is always uncertainty which is why the legal system tries to chart a middle course between these two.


I think we ought to go do what we did in the S&L [crisis] and actually put many of these guys in prison. Absolutely. These are not just white-collar crimes or little accidents. There were victims. That’s the point. There were victims all over the world.
When resources are scarce people turn to O crime rather than just I civil infractions of the law, Y-Oy predatory business looks for prey among Ro-R people in a negative sum game.

Economists focus on the whole notion of incentives. People have an incentive sometimes to behave badly, because they can make more money if they can cheat. If our economic system is going to work then we have to make sure that what they gain when they cheat is offset by a system of penalties.
Often these penalties need to be O criminal because when resources are scarce I civil penalties are just deducted against the profits made. The exception is when resources are abundant and it is easier to make more honest money in a positive sum game than to steal so much that others lose money.

Nobel prize winning economist George Akerlof has demonstrated that failure to punish white collar criminals – and instead bailing them out- creates incentives for more economic crimes and further destruction of the economy in the future.

Bailing out Iv-B companies is like putting fertilizer on weeds in the hope they will evolve into more stable plants. Better to weed them out and use this fertilizer on balanced Biv companies.

Indeed, professor of law and economics (and chief S&L prosecutor) William Black notes that we’ve known of this dynamic for “hundreds of years”. And see thisthisthis and this.
(Review of the data on accounting fraud confirms that fraud goes up as criminal prosecutions go down.)
The Director of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement division told Congress:
Recovery from the fallout of the financial crisis requires important efforts on various fronts, and vigorous enforcement is an essential component, as aggressive and even-handed enforcement will meet the public’s fair expectation that those whose violations of the law caused severe loss and hardship will be held accountable. And vigorous law enforcement efforts will help vindicate the principles that are fundamental to the fair and proper functioning of our markets: that no one should have an unjust advantage in our markets; that investors have a right to disclosure that complies with the federal securities laws; and that there is a level playing field for all investors.
The I-O police are slowly strengthening against Y-V companies after the economy hit the Iv-B ceiling. The Y-V top of the food chain is usually the last to lose money. 
Paul Zak (Professor of Economics and Department Chair, as well as the founding Director of the Center for Neuroeconomics Studies at Claremont Graduate wrote a paper called Trust and Growth, showing that enforcing the rule of law – i.e. prosecuting white collar fraud – is necessary for a healthy economy.

The problem is color rebalancing follows a set process, the I-O police are still weak after deregulation as Iv agents pressed for more freedom to exploit B clients. The momentum of change has not yet become strong enough, this can also be because of not enough Iv whistle blowers showing the true causes if the GFC.

One of the leading business schools in America – the Wharton School of Business – published an essay by a psychologist on the causes and solutions to the economic crisis. Wharton points out that restoring trust is the key to recovery, and that trust cannot be restored until wrongdoers are held accountable:
According to David M. Sachs, a training and supervision analyst at the Psychoanalytic Center of Philadelphia, the crisis today is not one of confidence, but one of trust. “Abusive financial practices were unchecked by personal moral controls that prohibit individual criminal behavior, as in the case of [Bernard] Madoff, and by complex financial manipulations, as in the case of AIG.” The public, expecting to be protected from such abuse, has suffered a trauma of loss similar to that after 9/11. “Normal expectations of what is safe and dependable were abruptly shattered,” Sachs noted. “As is typical of post-traumatic states, planning for the future could not be based on old assumptions about what is safe and what is dangerous. A radical reversal of how to be gratified occurred.”
The Bi community had their concept of normal business shattered by Iv-B chaos, this occurred in part because of a bias in the I-O police towards Iv agents allowing secretive problems to become systemically large.

 People now feel more gratified saving money than spending it, Sachs suggested. They have trouble trusting promises from the government because they feel the government has let them down.

V-Bi people like to save money rather than look for growth, this creates stagnation. The Iv-B growth parts oft he economy are still disconnected because of mistrust and because the I-O police are no longer believed to be stemming this chaos.
He framed his argument with a fictional patient named Betty Q. Public, a librarian with two teenage children and a husband, John, who had recently lost his job. “She felt betrayed because she and her husband had invested conservatively and were double-crossed by dishonest, greedy businessmen, and now she distrusted the government that had failed to protect them from corporate dishonesty.
They were B and chaotically deceived by Iv agents because of weak I-O policing, also because of other deceptive B people using liar loans which fed the deception from below. 

Not only that, but she had little trust in things turning around soon enough to enable her and her husband to accomplish their previous goals.
“By no means a sophisticated economist, she knew … that some people had become fantastically wealthy by misusing other people’s money — hers included,” Sachs said. “In short, John and Betty had done everything right and were being punished, while the dishonest people were going unpunished.”
They ended up as R prey to Oy financial predators, this happened because the middle oft he Roy food chain collapsed with weak policing. Usually these Oy predators would be moderated by O criminal penalties. When they weren't they multiplied exponentially like a contagion.

Helping an individual recover from a traumatic experience provides a useful analogy for understanding how to help the economy recover from its own traumatic experience, Sachs pointed out. The public will need to “hold the perpetrators of the economic disaster responsible and take what actions they can to prevent them from harming the economy again.” In addition, the public will have to see proof that government and business leaders can behave responsibly before they will trust them again, he argued.
Weak I-O policing happens in a cycle and will return again.

Note that Sachs urges “hold[ing] the perpetrators of the economic disaster responsible.” In other words, just “looking forward” and promising to do things differently isn’t enough.

If the I-O police don't have enough snitches and whistle blowers then they have to wait for things to actually go wrong before they can try to fix them. 

Robert Shiller – one of the top housing experts in the United States – says that the mortgage fraud is a lot like the fraud which occurred during the Great Depression notes:
Shiller said the danger of foreclosuregate — the scandal in which it has come to light that the biggest banks have routinely mishandled homeownership documents, putting the legality of one of the main causes of the Great Depression.

Chaos grows like cracks in the shape of B roots and Iv branches avoiding I-O police, where there is little oversight contagion like cockroaches will grow in numbers faster. To avoid this random auditing of these areas is like randomly exposing dark areas to look for cockroaches.

Economist James K. Galbraith wrote in the introduction to his father, John Kenneth Galbraith’s, definitive study of the Great Depression, The Great Crash, 1929:
The main relevance of The Great Crash, 1929 to the great crisis of 2008 is surely here. In both cases, the government knew what it should do. Both times, it declined to do it. In the summer of 1929 a few stern words from on high, a rise in the discount rate, a tough investigation into the pyramid schemes of the day, and the house of cards on Wall Street would have tumbled before its fall destroyed the whole economy.
This is usually not possible in a color imbalance which has to work itself through the colors in order. The problem is this color imbalance makes these stern words impossible to deliver or ineffective.

 In 2004, the FBI warned publicly of “an epidemic of mortgage fraud.” But the government did nothing, and less than nothing, delivering instead low interest rates, deregulation and clear signals that laws would not be enforced. The signals were not subtle: on one occasion the director of the Office of Thrift Supervision came to a conference with copies of the Federal says:
There will have to be full-scale investigation and cleaning up of the residue of that, before you can have, I think, a return of confidence in the financial sector. And that’s a process which needs to get underway.
When the I-O police are weakened Iv-B civil infractions of the law grow exponentially but this seems very slow at first, it appears there is plenty of time to stop it. However exponentially growth can quickly zoom up wards when it develops momentum.

Goldman Sachs Executive Director Corroborates Reggie Middleton's Stance: Business Model Designed To Walk Over Clients

Goldman Sachs Executive Director Corroborates Reggie Middleton's Stance: Business Model Designed To Walk Over Clients

And now we have supporting evidence from the inside... From the NYT:
"TODAY is my last day at Goldman Sachs. After almost 12 years at the firm — first as a summer intern while at Stanford, then in New York for 10 years, and now in London — I believe I have worked here long enough to understand the trajectory of its culture, its people and its identity. I can honestly say that the environment now is as toxic and destructive as I have ever seen it."
"To put the problem in the simplest terms, the interests of the client continue to be sidelined in the way the firm operates and thinks about making money."

As the economy becomes more Roy after the GFC Iv agents become more Oy predatory. Iv tends to look for positive sum games where both sides benefit, Iv agents try to benefit most of all. In Oy there is a scarcity of resources often mixed with G public money, Oy tries to reduce their risk and losses by inflicting more losses on their R or Oy clients. 

"I knew it was time to leave when I realized I could no longer look students in the eye and tell them what a great place this was to work."
" I have always taken a lot of pride in advising my clients to do what I believe is right for them, even if it means less money for the firm. This view is becoming increasingly unpopular at Goldman Sachs. Another sign that it was time to leave."
 "How did we get here? The firm changed the way it thought about leadership. Leadership used to be about ideas, setting an example and doing the right thing. Today, if you make enough money for the firm (and are not currently an ax murderer) you will be promoted into a position of influence. What are three quick ways to become a leader? a) Execute on the firm’s “axes,” which is Goldman-speak for persuading your clients to invest in the stocks or other products that we are trying to get rid of because they are not seen as having a lot of potential profit. b) “Hunt Elephants.” In English: get your clients — some of whom are sophisticated, and some of whom aren’t — to trade whatever will bring the biggest profit to Goldman. Call me old-fashioned, but I don’t like selling my clients a product that is wrong for them. c) Find yourself sitting in a seat where your job is to trade any illiquid, opaque product with a three-letter acronym."
"I attend derivatives sales meetings where not one single minute is spent asking questions about how we can help clients. It’s purely about how we can make the most possible money off of them. If you were an alien from Mars and sat in on one of these meetings, you would believe that a client’s success or progress was not part of the thought process at all."
"It makes me ill how callously people talk about ripping their clients off. Over the last 12 months I have seen five different managing directors refer to their own clients as “muppets,” sometimes over internal e-mail. Even after the S.E.C., Fabulous Fab, Abacus, God’s work, Carl Levin, Vampire Squids? No humility? I mean, come on. Integrity? It is eroding. I don’t know of any illegal behavior, but will people push the envelope and pitch lucrative and complicated products to clients even if they are not the simplest investments or the ones most directly aligned with the client’s goals? Absolutely. Every day, in fact.
It astounds me how little senior management gets a basic truth: If clients don’t trust you they will eventually stop doing business with you. It doesn’t matter how smart you are.

Iv and Oy use short term competitive tactics, they don't look at what will eventually happen because the object is to make more than others then get out before the crash. If the clients are V banks and companies sometimes becoming Y then they use companies like this as agents, the idea is their agents will gouge others more than them.

These days, the most common question I get from junior analysts about derivatives is, “How much money did we make off the client?” It bothers me every time I hear it, because it is a clear reflection of what they are observing from their leaders about the way they should behave. Now project 10 years into the future: You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to figure out that the junior analyst sitting quietly in the corner of the room hearing about “muppets,” “ripping eyeballs out” and “getting paid” doesn’t exactly turn into a model citizen."